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In 1997, then-Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") Reed Hundt delivered a speech to the leaders of the
cable industry in which he described the future of cable television in terms of
what he called "the Franchise."' According to Hundt, this model "consists of
the core package of the most popular TV channels and the most popular way to
deliver them." Hundt acknowledged that the cable industry "has made huge
inroads on the delivery side," and classified broadcast television as "the other
side of the Franchise." 2 The Chairman further forecasted that "the core pro-
gramming package may or may not be possessed by local broadcasters in the
future."'
Nearly thirteen years after Chairman Hundt foretold an all-in-one entertain-
ment content and delivery service, the Comcast Corporation ("Comcast") is on
its way to realizing this vision of "the Franchise," as the media delivery giant
undertakes efforts to merge with NBC Universal.' If successful, the merger
would give the nation's largest cable corporation control over NBC Univer-
t J.D. Candidate, May 2011. Tom would like to thank his parents, Thomas and Donna
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Associates of COMMLAW CONSPECTUS Volumes 18 and 19 for their valued input and advice.
I Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Speech at the National Cable
Television Association: Cable, Broadcasting, and The Franchise (Mar. 18, 1997) [hereinaf-
ter Chairman Hundt speech].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See Cecilia Kang, Merger Plans for Comcast, NBC Ignite Battle Over Television
Access, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2009, at Al.
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would give the nation's largest cable corporation control over NBC Univer-
sal's immensely popular programming, along with its entire production, distri-
bution, and entertainment interests.' Since Chairman Hundt's prediction, the
video entertainment market has undergone widespread changes-from the in-
creased popularity of satellites, to the advent of online television, which allows
broadcasters to stream previously-aired television programs and encourages
users to become the creators and publishers of video content, often for free and
without advertising support. These developments are direct challenges to tradi-
tional multichannel video programming distributors ("MVPDs"), which must
experiment with new business models in order to remain competitive.6
This article analyzes the merger between Comcast and NBC Universal to
determine whether the FCC should block the merger or place conditions on the
parties as a prerequisite to the merger. The article concludes that, when viewed
through the lens of the "new media marketplace," the combination of a large
cable company such as Comcast and media giant NBC Universal will not pre-
sent a cognizable, defined harm to the public interest.
The Commission's public interest mandate is to ensure diversity, competi-
tion, innovation, and localism in the marketplace. In the new media market-
place, diverse programming thrives in a highly competitive and innovative en-
vironment, and those who wish to produce and disseminate content face low
barriers to entry. The FCC should not impose conditions for niche and minority
programming as a prerequisite to clearing its merger review. However, the pro-
posed merger may harm local programming. Thus, any merger conditions
should assure that NBC affiliate stations have sufficient funds to deliver qual-
ity local programming to the public.
Furthermore, while the Commission may be tempted to go beyond its public
interest mandate, it should refrain from imposing any conditions that would
better be addressed through industry-wide rulemaking or Congressional action.
Network neutrality and retransmission rules are not appropriate issues for the
Commission to address under the auspice of a merger review. The Comcast-
NBC model may not be the optimal way to deliver the most popular content,
and the intense competition of the new media marketplace may very well ren-
der the model unviable-a prospect that many stakeholders have yet to recog-
nize.
Part II introduces the merger, the parties involved, and the controversial
5 See Memorandum from Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democratic Staff to Mem-
bers of the Subcomm. on Commc'ns, Tech. and the Internet 1 (July 2, 2010), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100702/Briefing.Memo.CTI.2010.07.08.pd
f.
6 See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, Hulu-Disney Deal Hurts YouTube, Helps Cable,
CNET.coM (Apr. 30, 2009, 12:11 PM PDT), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 3-10231195-
93.html.
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"TV Everywhere" concept, which many argue that, after the merger, will result
in anti-consumer and anti-competitive effects. Part III explains the role of the
FCC in the proposed deal and provides a primer on its public interest standard
as applied to cable and broadcasting. Part IV examines the public interest ten-
ets of competition and innovation, diversity, and localism through the lens of
the new media marketplace. Part IV also contains a forward-looking discussion
of the various distribution and business models of the new media marketplace.
Part V will address the FCC's temptation to tackle issues beyond the accept-
able scope of a merger review. While it is enticing to proclaim that the public
interest mandate allows the Commission to regulate net neutrality and failing
retransmission rules, such regulation would be ill-advised. The article con-
cludes by suggesting that the new business model pursued by Comcast may
not, in fact, survive in the new media marketplace-and will address whether
Comcast-NBC has truly achieved Hundt's vision of "the Franchise."
II. THE COMCAST-NBC MERGER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Announced in December 2009, the Comcast-NBC Universal merger prom-
ises to usher in the "future of media and entertainment."' Upon approval of the
proposed merger, Comcast would own fifty-one percent of NBC Universal.'
More importantly, Comcast would control NBC Universal's vast wealth of con-
tent. The vertical integration of development, programming, and delivery
raises questions about the future of video entertainment, both in the traditional
video marketplace and online.
A. The Pre-Merger Entities
Over its nearly fifty-year history, Comcast has grown from a humble single
cable system in Tupelo, Mississippi to the largest multichannel video pro-
gramming video distributor, largest residential broadband provider, and one of
the largest telephone service providers in the United States.' In its own words,
7 David Goetzl, Comcast Pitches Hollywood, Pols On NBC Merger, MEDIA POST NEws
(July 1, 2010. 5:25 PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art-aid=1 32436&nid= 1
16840.
8 NBC Universal Transaction: About the Transaction, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/about.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011). The two
companies would have redemption rights that allow for Comcast's eventual 100 percent
ownership of the new venture. Id.
9 Corporate Information, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/corporate/about/corporateinfo/corporateinfo.html (last visited Jan.
1, 2011); About Comcast Cable, COMCAST,
http://comcastcalifornia.mediaroom.com/index.php (follow "Bios and Facts" hyperlink)
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"Comcast is principally involved in the development, management, and opera-
tion of cable systems and the delivery of programming content" in thirty-nine
states and the District of Columbia.'o Today, the company serves "22.9 million
cable subscribers, 16.7 million high-speed Internet customers, and 8.4 million
Comcast Digital Voice customers."" The company also owns a number of
television stations, including nearly a dozen local sports channels (the Comcast
SportsNet stations), Versus, The Golf Channel, E! Entertainment Television,
The Style Network, and TVOne.' 2
Majority-owned by General Electric since 2004," NBC Universal is a media
and entertainment conglomerate comprised of a television group, film produc-
tion and distribution network, numerous theme parks, and an innovative digital
media operation."4 NBC Universal is home to some of America's most beloved
media and entertainment assets, including The Tonight Show, Saturday Night
Live, Sunday Night Football, and the productions of Universal Studios in Hol-
lywood, " with its film operations anchored by the wildly successful Universal
Pictures, Universal Home Entertainment, and Focus Features." Together, these
entities produce and hold title to a vast collection of new and classic films."
NBC Universal's media interests also include numerous news stations, such as
(last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
1o See Comcast Press Kit, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/medialibrary/1/1/about/pressroom/documents/PressKit.pdf (last
visited Jan. 1, 2011), at 1.
I See Corporate Overview, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/corporate/about/pressroom/corporateoverview/corporateoverview.
html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011). Comcast Digital Voice is "an innovative and reliable IP-
enabled home phone service that includes all of the functions of traditional phone services,
plus enhanced features that are integrated with other Comcast services." Id.
12 See Comcast Cable Networks, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/corporate/about/pressroom/comcastcablenetworks/comcastcablene
tworks.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
13 General Electric purchased NBC in 1985. In 2004, it renamed the media venture
"NBC Universal," after gaining control of Universal Studios and a number of cable net-
works. David Goldman, GE, Comcast Announce Joint NBC Deal, CNNMONEY.COM (Dec.
3, 2009, 9:57 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcastnbc/index.htm.
14 Company Overview: This Is NBC Universal, NBC UNIVERSAL,
http://www.nbcuni.com/AboutNBCUniversal/CompanyOverview/NBCUniversalTele
vision Group.shtml (last visited Jan. 1, 2011) (providing a full list of NBC Universal's en-
tertainment assets) [hereinafter NBC Universal Overview].
Is Id.; see also Press Release, Comcast Corp., Joint Venture Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/JointVenureFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter Joint
Venture Fact Sheet].
16 Id. NBC Universal Company Overview, Film, NBC UNIVERSAL,
http://www.nbcuni.com/AboutNBCUniversal/CompanyOverview/Film.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 7, 2010)
17 See, e.g., id. (listing some of the company's most successful films).
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CNBC and MSNBC, and international and online media operations.'"
B. The Post-Merger Entity
Upon approval of the proposed merger, Comcast would own fifty-one per-
cent of NBC Universal." Initially, General Electric would retain forty-nine
percent of the company, with a path provided for Comcast's eventual 100 per-
cent ownership.20 Functionally, the new NBC Universal will be headquartered
in New York, but managed by Philadelphia-based Comcast.2 1 The new entity's
five-member board of directors will be comprised of three Comcast executives
and two General Electric executives.22
Along with its movie and television production studios, online video and
news companies, and Universal theme parks, the new venture would bring to-
gether the entirety of both NBC Universal's and Comcast's cable television
stations, 23 as well as NBC's Telemundo stations and its 234 NBC network
broadcast affiliates. 24 Importantly, the combined entity would have ownership
of a massive collection of film titles and television shows and their distribution
services.25
C. The Business Model of the Post-Merger Entity
One of the most controversial aspects of the post-merger entity is the em-
ployment of a new method of distribution method termed "TV Everywhere."
The TV Everywhere model links online media viewing with the traditional
cable bill, requiring that users authenticate their cable subscription to gain ac-
cess to online content.26 Opponents of the merger argue that, by joining forces
18 Id.; Press Release, Comcast Corp., JV Cable Networks and Digital Assets Overview,
available at
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/JV CableNetworks-and DigitalAssetsOverv
iew.pdf [hereinafter JV Digital Assets Overview].
'9 NBC Universal Transaction: About the Transaction, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/about.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011)
20 See id. (noting that the agreement provides that "GE may retain a preferred interest in
the venture in certain circumstances.").
21 Joint Venture Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
22 Id
23 These include the USA, Bravo, SyFy, Universal HD, CNBC, CNBC World, MSNBC,
Chiller, mun2, Sleuth, Oxygen, E!, Golf Channel, Style Network, Versus, G4, and The
Comcast Network cable television networks. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. These include NBC Universal Domestic and International Distribution and Uni-
versal Studios Home Entertainment.
26 Chris Albrecht, Everything You Need to Know About TV Everywhere, NEwTEEVEE
(June 23, 2009, 11:03 PM), http://newteevee.com/2009/06/23/what-you-need-to-know-
about-tv-everywhere/; see Chris Albrecht, Media Companies Plan Weapons of Mass Au-
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with NBC Universal and employing "TV Everywhere", Comcast would act as
gatekeeper to a massive wealth of premium content, with anti-competitive and
anti-consumer results.27
Comcast touts its model as fundamentally providing more content across
new platforms; offering customers "exponentially more free content, more
choice and more HD programming online as well as on TV."28 From Com-
cast's perspective, controlling and integrating the production, programming,
and video cache aspects of NBC Universal is integral to these goals. By merg-
ing with NBC Universal, Comcast is essentially purchasing outright something
for which it would have to pay more under traditional programmer-MVPD
arrangements.29 Thus, internalizing and streamlining NBC Universal content is
the least expensive way to pursue its TV Everywhere model. In reality, the
post-merger entity will provide endless video entertainment on-demand, to the
benefit of consumers.
D. Criticisms of the Post-Merger Business Model
Critics of the merger worry that, by combining with NBC Universal, Com-
cast would be in possession of a vast amount of "must-see" programming that
would only be available to Comcast subscribers. They suggest that, because
TV Everywhere originated out of cooperation with cable companies, the TV
Everywhere business model would constitute collusion, violate basic antitrust
laws, and stifle online video competition.3' For example, in a January 2010
report, Marvin Ammori of the media reform organization Free Press observed
that this business plan, which transposes the existing cable TV model onto the
online market, "consists of agreements among competitors to divide markets,
thentication, NEwTEEVEE (Mar. 3, 2009, 8:00 AM),
http://newteevee.com/2009/03/05/media-companies-plan-weapons-of-mass-authentication/.
27 See David Hatch, Cutting the Cord: The Proposed Comcast-NBC Merger Could Put




29 See CHARLES GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41063, THE PROPOSED COM-
CAST-NBC UNIVERSAL COMBINATION: How IT MIGHT AFFECT THE VIDEO MARKET 14
(2010).
30 For example, because NBC Universal holds title to all Universal Studios motion pic-
tures, movies released on DVD could be viewed on-demand through Comcast's delivery
services the day of release (or conceivably even earlier). Additionally, customers can take
greater advantage of existing agreements between Comcast and Netflix, and online delivery
platforms such as Hulu.
31 MARVIN AMMORI, FREE PRESS, TV COMPETITION NOWHERE: How THE CABLE INDUS-
TRY IS COLLUDING TO KILL ONLINE TV (2010), available at
http://www.freepress.net/files/TV-Nowhere.pdf.
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raise prices, exclude new competitors, and tie products . . . a textbook case of
collusion."32 Other critics of the model have issued white papers" and sent
letters to the Department of Justice34 calling for immediate investigations into
both the method of establishing the service and its alleged threat to online
competition."
The collusion claims asserted by Free Press and others are grounded in alle-
gations of price fixing among companies.3 While TV Everywhere is a collabo-
rative effort between two leading cable companies, Comcast and Time War-
ner," the two entities do not set a fixed price on this service. The TV Every-
where model simply requires that a viewer pay their traditional cable bill-a
figure that is set independently by each cable provider." The question then
becomes whether this collaborative effort rises to the level of an antitrust viola-
tion by way of intentionally discouraging competition and acting as gatekeeper
to content on the Web. Free Press and others would answer this question in the
affirmative, and have accordingly filed petitions with the FCC to deny the
merger.39 However, any model that Comcast decides to employ will do little to
quell the robust competition in the online video market.
Additionally, opponents argue that Comcast and Time Warner are dividing
the market and unlawfully tying their new product to existing services.40 The
32 Id. at 3.
3 See, e.g., MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & CORIE WRIGHT, FREE PRESS,
WHY THE COMCAST/NBC MERGER POSES A MAJOR THREAT TO VIDEO COMPETITION THAT
ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES CANNOT IGNORE, available at
http://www.freepress.net/files/FPCFA-Comcast-NBC-WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter Free
Press White Paper].
34 See, e.g., Letter from Mark Cooper, Consumer Fed'n of Am., et al., to Christine
Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.freepress.net/files/TVEverywhere DOJLetter.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Dep't
of Justice] (requesting an investigation into potential antitrust violations regarding TV Eve-
rywhere).
3 See Free Press White Paper, supra note 33; Letter to Dep't of Justice, supra note 34.
36 See Free Press White Paper, supra note 33; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1309
(9th ed. 2009) (defining "price fixing" as "the artificial setting or maintenance of prices at a
certain level, contrary to the workings of a free market").
37 Staci Kramer, Comcast, Time Warner Decide To Fight Together (Instead of Each
Other) For TV Everywhere, PAIDCONTENT.ORG, (June 23, 2009, 6:45 PM EDT)
http://paidcontent.org/article/419-comcast-time-warner-decide-to-fight-together-instead-of-
each-other-for-/; see also Tim Arango, Cable TV's Big Worry: Taming the Web, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2009 at B 1.
38 See Arango, supra note 37.
39 In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses or Transfer Control of Licensees, Petition to
Deny of Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, and Media Ac-
cess Project, MB Docket No. 10-56 (June 21, 2010) (accessible via FCC Electronic Com-
ment Filing System) [hereinafter Consumer Federation of America Petition to Deny].




division of markets argument, although seemingly a direct violation of antitrust
laws,4 is merely a de facto result of the companies' different geographical ser-
vice areas.42 Because the authentication process hinges on existing cable sub-
scriptions, it logically follows that Comcast will authenticate in certain areas of
the country while Time Warner authenticates in others. As for tying, critics
argue that "by tying online television to incumbent MVPD subscriptions, TV
Everywhere is designed to undermine new forms of competition and consumer
choice currently emerging over the Internet."43 Again, the new entity will
merely offer what it already provides to its cable subscribers on an additional,
innovative platform."
III. THE COMMISSION'S ROLE
The FCC has jurisdiction over the merger by virtue of the transfer of broad-
cast licenses between NBC and Comcast. In its review, the Commission must
evaluate the effects of the proposed combination through its mandate to uphold
the ambiguous "public interest".45 The Department of Justice (DoJ) is also
charged with independent reviews of mergers under section 7 of the Clayton
Act,46 however "the trend in antitrust law has not been to review 'vertical'
mergers closely."4 7 Thus "given the direct interrelationship between these
mergers with regulatory policy, the FCC stands in an important position"
among federal agencies to ensure that the merger serves the interests of the
public.48 The Commission's review of the proposed joint venture becomes es-
pecially important in this particular case.49
41 See Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1(2010).
42 See Hali Pedersen & Kari Hirsch, T. V. Violations Everywhere?, DIGITALHHR.COM
(Feb. 19, 2010, 9:09 PM), http://digitalhhr.com/2010/02/t-v-iolations-everywhere/.
43 Letter to Dep't of Justice, supra note 34, at 2; see also AMMORI, supra note 31, at 37.
4 Statement, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Statement of NCTA President & CEO
Kyle McSlarrow on TV Everywhere (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.ncta.com/ReleaseType/Statement/McSlarrow-Statement-on-TV-
Everywhere.aspx. [hereinafter McSlarrow Statement].
45 Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC
Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of the "Public Interest" Standard, 18 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUs 329, 334 (2010).
46 See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads 424-25 (2005).
47 Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 45, at 335.
48 Id.
49 It practically follows that the federal agency charged with regulating the telecommu-
nications field would have the responsibility to evaluate mergers within that field. This
"dual-review process" is not uncommon in complex industries. The FCC's public interest
evaluation naturally overlaps with the DOJ's and FTC's antitrust analyses and involves "a
thorough economic analysis of competitive issues." However, the Commission is distin-
guished as a regulatory body with expertise in the telecommunications field, which can and
will often come to different conclusions than those of the DOJ or FTC. In contrast to the
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A. The FCC's Statutory Authority
Congress and the FCC have long intervened in the MVPD market to foster
the goals of competition, innovation, diversity, and localism. For example, the
Commission has regulated the relationship among video distribution platforms
via its retransmission requirements,50 "must-carry obligations,',51 and "pro-
gram access" rules. 52 The FCC rules have aimed to promote greater program-
ming diversity and localism via channel occupancy rules,53 and horizontal
ownership limits.54
Congress expanded the FCC's regulatory authority to include cable through
several legislative acts-namely the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. " In the text of the 1984 Act, Con-
gress noted its goals of ensuring that cable systems were "responsive to the
needs and interests of the local community" and "encouraged to provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public,"
while "promot[ing] competition in cable communications and minimiz[ing]
unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable
systems."" In 1992, Congress recognized that the cable industry had become
"highly concentrated" and that "[t]he potential effects of such concentration
[were] barriers to entry for new programmers and a reduction in the number of
traditional antitrust approach, which "by definition, largely focuses the attention of the anti-
rust authorities on the current competitive environment," the FCC takes into account "the
environment that is likely to emerge over the next five to ten years"-a context that is of
particular note in this case. See id. at 339-340.
5o 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2006) (forbidding cable systems from retransmitting
broadcast signals without the express permission of broadcasters).
" 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (2006) (requiring local cable systems to carry broadcasters'
pro ramming in place of retransmission consent negotiations).
47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5) (providing that restrictions should remain in effect only if "nec-
essary to preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video pro-
gramming").
5 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (limiting the number of channels on a cable system in
which the operator has a financial interest).
54 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (limiting the number of subscribers a cable company may
reach). The horizontal cable ownership rules aimed "to preclude cable companies from
growing large enough to exercise monopsony power, principally through collusive favorit-
ism for certain programming suppliers". See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 46, at
370.
5 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
56 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2006)).
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media voices available to consumers."" Congress also recognized that
[t]he cable industry has become vertically integrated; cable operators and cable pro-
grammers often have common ownership. As a result, cable operators have the incen-
tive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers. This could make it more difficult
for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage on cable systems. Vertically
integrated program suppliers also have the incentive and ability to favor their affili-
ated cable operators and programming distributors using other technologies.
With these concepts in mind, the FCC has the power to regulate cable provid-
ers and programmers through licensing." Today, the Commission can issue
certificates for new cable lines,o assign and transfer licenses,61 regulate car-
riage and carriage agreements, and set terms and conditions regarding video
programming distribution, with the goal of developing competition and diver-
sity therein. Each of these duties is intrinsically tied to the public interest stan-
dard that the Commission must uphold.
B. The Public Interest Standard
Despite the Commission's commitment to upholding it, the public interest is
ambiguous.62 Often, instead of blocking a merger, the Commission will impose
so-called "voluntary" conditions as a prerequisite for merger approval." De-
spite these condition, however, there are "still few guideposts to structure the
analysis of what remedies are appropriate and whether they are enforced effec-
tively."64 Thus, we are left in an "era of informality" in the merger review
process." Indeed, the public interest evaluation "has been an ambitious enter-
prise" and one that is further complicated by technological developments." As
the Benton Foundation aptly noted more than ten years ago,
[t]his challenge has been complicated in recent years by rapid and far-reaching
" Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2006)).
ss Id.
59 Id
60 See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006) (requiring common carriers to obtain a certificate of
public convenience and necessity).
6' See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006) (giving the FCC the authority to determine whether
transfer of licenses will be in public interest).
62 See Philip Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual
Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L. J. 167, 169-170 (2008).
63 Id. at 168.
64 Id. at 197.
65 Id. at 170 (noting that "such conditions are developed without the benefit of notice
and comment, are often negotiated in haste, and are not subject to judicial review. Nonethe-
less, given the FCC's ability to simply withhold approval of a license transfer . . . parties
understandably view such conditions as a cost of doing business."); see also id. at 197 ("the
selections of merger remedies remain relatively opaque and under-analyzed.").
66 BENTON FOUNDATION, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE 17 (1998),
available at http://www.benton.org/sites/benton.org/files/recs.pdf.
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changes in technology and market structures, not to mention evolving public needs.
As competition in the telecommunications marketplace becomes more acute and as
the competitive dynamics of TV broadcasting change, the capacities of the free mar-
ketplace to serve public ends are being tested as never before.61
While The Benton Foundation made this observation almost a decade ago, the
advent of new technologies and the evolving online media marketplace make
this especially true today.
The rationales that once justified regulation of broadcast radio and television
are not applicable to the new media market. Cable has not traditionally been
subject to the same stringent regulation as scarce resources like radio. 8 In fact,
"it has never been regulated as a public trustee required to provide public ser-
vice content in categories such as children's television or informational pro-
gramming."" In the diverse and competitive new media market, the scarcity of
spectrum rationales that once justified regulation of broadcast industries are no
longer applicable to cable.70 Now, in the diverse and competitive new media
market and its unlimited entrant potential, calls for higher regulation will be
that much harder to defend.
Courts have previously rebuked the Commission for exceeding the proper
limits of its authority in the context of a merger review generally. For instance,
although the public interest standard requires a review of competitive effects,
courts have made it clear that it is not the Commission's duty to "subordinate
the public interest to the interest of 'equaliz[ing] competition among competi-
tors.""' Applied to the case at hand, this means that the agency would be out-
side the bounds of its mandate if it were to impose conditions on the merger
solely out of fear that the new entity would harm competition among existing
MVPDs, and not because there was a genuine, cognizable harm to the public.
Thus, the Commission must ensure that it limits the scope of its analysis to the
interests and needs of the public, and not Comcast's competitors or even those
who claim to speak for the public at large.
As the FCC proceeds through its public interest review of the current
merger, it will certainly need to limit the scope of its analysis to the needs and
interests of the public. The Commission must recognize also the limitations
placed on its scope by the courts when dealing with cable communications.
67 Id.
68 Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era: Hearing Before the FCC (2010)
(statement of Henry Geller, Former FCC General Counsel).
69 See id (citing the Cable Communications Act of 1984 § 624(f)(1)).
70 See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (finding that
cable regulation should be held to a lower of scrutiny than that of broadcast because spec-
trum scarcity and signal interference are not present with cable, and therefore do not create
cause for regulation).
71 See Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 45, at 342-343 (quoting SBC Commc'ns Inc. v.
FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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Most importantly, the public interest analysis must take place through the lens
of the new media marketplace - as this is the current and emerging market in
which the Commission is charged with upholding the public interest.
IV. A PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
NEW MEDIA MARKETPLACE
In its public interest analysis, the Commission must consider the potential
effects of the merger to ensure four qualities are found in the current and
emerging video market: (1) competition, (2) innovation, (3) diversity, and (4)
media localism. Although opponents argue that the FCC should impose condi-
tions on the merger related to each of these, this section demonstrates that
merger conditions are not necessary for the competition, innovation, and diver-
sity prongs of the public interest analysis. However, it recognizes that condi-
tions may be appropriate to preserve investment in and availability of local
news and entertainment programming. In each case, however, it is imperative
that the Commission review the merger through the lens of the new media
marketplace-a video market robust with competition, innovation, and low
barriers to entry for minority and niche content producers.
A. Competition and Innovation
The proposed merger between Comcast and NBC Universal comes at a time
when the video entertainment market is on the brink of fundamental change.72
For years, technological constraints and high barriers to entry limited innova-
tion in both programming and delivery. The traditional media marketplace re-
volved around the need to gather around the family television set at a prede-
termined time to view content created by broadcast networks. Now, new de-
vices and services facilitate both the creation and delivery of content, and have
abolished any such obstructions to consumer choice. Current FCC Commis-
sioner Robert McDowell aptly describes the current age as a time of "media
adolescence."" This adolescent market holds the promise of incredibly innova-
tive ways to deliver content, combined with previously-unthinkable low barri-
ers to entry in the market for creating that content. The combination of low-to-
nonexistent barriers to entry and increasingly innovative video platforms re-
quire traditional MVPDs to adapt to ensure their continued survival.
72 See GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 2-6.
7 Robert M. McDowell, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Virginia
Association of Broadcasters 73d Annual Summer Convention (June 25, 2010), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/mcdowel/speeches.html.
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1. Innovation: TV Without the TV
The viewers of the new media marketplace are increasingly trading in cable
subscriptions and television sets for newer technologies that provide free, on-
the-go programming. As noted by a series of articles in the Washington Post
last year, viewers are becoming increasingly reluctant to sit in front of a televi-
sion at a time predetermined by broadcast networks or cable stations." Addi-
tionally, many of these viewers have come to expect programming to be free -
"never something [they] expected to pay for in the first place."" Although
many viewers are disconnected from the classic broadcast and cable television
schedule, they do not miss out on the programs enjoyed by millions of Ameri-
cans each week via more traditional methods. Rather, these technology-savvy
citizens are able to stream or download programs directly to their laptops,
iPods, and other portable devices.76
The result has been the emergence of an entirely new, innovative and com-
petitive industry. In the mobile video market, device manufacturers continue to
roll out products for the sole purpose of watching programming on the go. As
an example, Qualcomm's FloTV, made popular by 2010 Superbowl ads," util-
izes a UHF channel to integrate live television with its own portable player,
and "instead of the often-flaky 3G service offered by most [wireless] carri-
ers."" The service "broadcast[s] about [twenty] mobile channels, including
ESPN, Nickelodeon, MTV, and Disney Channel," and continues to add chan-
nels, including news giant CNN." Other devices, such as the iPhone, permit
users to record video and stream content live to the web."o By enabling viewers
to "cut the cable cord," the proliferation of such devices permit viewers to
watch and create video when and where they want, often commercial-free or
with limited interruption.' Thus, the threat of an "entertainment void" facing
74 See Paul Farhi, Click, Change: The Traditional Tube Is Getting Squeezed Out of the
Picture, WASH. PosT, May 17, 2009, at El; Monica Hesse, Web Series Are Coming Into A
Prime Time of Their Own, WASH. POST, May 17, 2009, at El.
7 Farhi, supra note 74, at El.
76 Id
77 Dan Butcher, Qualcomm's FloTV Runs Three Super Bowl Ads, MOBILE MARKETER
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.mobilemarketer.com/cms/news/television/5329.html.
78 See Alex Pham, FloTV Drives Mobile Television Beyond Cellphones, L.A. TIMES
COMPANY TOwN BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 3:46 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/01/flotv-mobile-dtv-
television-cell-phones.html.
7 See Press Release, Qualcomm, CNN Mobile Now Available on the FLO TV Service
(Mar 12, 2010), available at http://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2010/03/12/cnn-
mobile-now-available-flo-tv-service.
80 RefreshedlT, Broadcast Live Video Over 3G Cell Phones, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is6q6hG7ijA.
81 Nick Bilton, Cable Freedom Is a Click Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at B5.
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viewers who drop their cable bill becomes something of a fiction.8 2
Nick Bilton of the New York Times recently chronicled the countless ways
in which someone hoping for "cable freedom" can cut the cord.83 Mr. Bilton
described his family's move from tossing out their television into creating what
sounds like the living room of the future, right down to the new $99 "choco-
late-frosted doughnut"-like remote.84 In the process, however, Mr. Bilton cata-
logued the assortment of "retired devices" in his "Gadget Graveyard."" Along
with his cable box, traditional remote, and canceled cable subscription are
"single-serving contraptions" like the Roku box, Apple TV, Slingbox, and
Vudu players, which have only recently become available in the past three
years." Yet, even these new devices are threatened by future all-encompassing
technologies.
In his article, Mr. Bilton triumphantly arrives at having only "a Mac Mini,
wireless mouse and a Microsoft Xbox hooked up to [the] television."" How-
ever, one cannot help but wonder how long such a setup will last. With the
array of obsolete devices in the Bilton living room evocative of a scene out of
The Brave Little Toaster," innovative video distributors must constantly won-
der when their newest products will become obsolete as well. Along with in-
novation, viability in a competitive market should be a major concern for any-
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also Berin Szoka, Cutting the Video Cord: Pro-Regulatory NYT Realizes
'Cable Freedom Is a Click Away, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://techliberation.com/2009/12/15/cutting-the-video-cord-pro-regulatory-nyt-realizes-
cable-freedom-is-a-click-away/.
84 Mr. Bilton refers to a device that navigates the screen; to use it "you hold it out and
wave your hand from side to side as if you are conducting an orchestra." Bilton, supra note
81, at B5.
85 Id.
86 Id.; see Editorial, Inside the Tech of the Nettlix Player with Roku, HOTHARDWARE
(May 29, 2008),
http://hothardware.com/News/InsideTheTech Of The NetflixPlayer With Rokul/
(describing Roku as a Netflix "set-top box for watching on-demand movies and TV"); Press
Release, Apple, Apple TV Now Shipping (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/03/21appletv.html ("Apple TV [is] an easy to use and
fun way to wirelessly play all of your favorite iTunes content from your PC or Mac on your
widescreen TV, including movies, TV shows, music, photos and podcasts."); Slingbox,
SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/go/slingbox (last visited Jan. 1, 2011) ("Slingbox
makes it easy to watch and control your home TV from virtually anywhere, anytime on your
desktop, Mac, laptop, or mobile phone."); Background, VUDU,
http://www.vudu.com/aboutus background.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011) ("VUDU box
and service deliver instant access to thousands of movies and TV shows directly through the
television, without requiring a computer or cable/satellite TV service.").
87 Id.
88 See THE BRAVE LITTLE TOASTER (Hyperion Pictures 1987); see also The Brave Little
Toaster, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092695/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 1, 2011) (describing the film about a group of dated appliances as having a "dark
subtext of abandonment, obsolescence, and loneliness").
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one hoping to deliver video to the masses in a more amenable fashion.
2. Competition: The New Business Models of the New Media Marketplace
The traditional business model for media has been to pursue profits through
advertising." In this model, radio stations and broadcast networks remained
operational because advertisers readily paid large sums of money for airtime.
In a changing media landscape, where the absence of commercials is one of the
biggest draws of new distribution technologies,"o MVPDs must find new ways
of generating profits without relying on advertising.9" "Unfortunately," as
Shelly Palmer of WNBC-NY aptly observes, "there is no business model
called 'no one pays."' 2 Palmer has adapted to find new ways to profit from his
free online program through what he calls the "Jerry Garcia model", earning
money through consultations, speaking engagements, and by selling books and
other merchandise." By becoming as widely known as possible, Mr. Palmer
has branded himself-and his brand has value. Those who wish to take advan-
tage of his skills and use him outside the television show and Mediabytes pro-
gram must pay for his more conventional services and appearances.94 He con-
tinues to explore ways to make a daily online program both free of third party
advertisements and free to users." Similarly, other content-holders are strug-
gling to find models that produce profits as well, and have experimented in a
number of ways.
89 See Adam Marcus, The Quid Pro Quo In Practice, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT BLOG
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/09/09/the-quid-pro-quo-in-practice/; Berin
Szoka, There Is No Free Lunch! No Advertising, No Media, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT BLOG
(June 25, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/06/25/there-is-no-free-lunch-no-advertising-
no-medial.
90 Marcus, supra note 89.
91 Szoka, supra note 83.
92 Shelly Palmer, A Serious Online Video Advertising Problem, SHELLEY PALMER DIGI-
TAL LIVING (June 14, 2009), http://www.shellypalmermedia.com/2009/06/14/a-serious-
online-video-advertising-problem/. Palmer's half-hour television show and two-minute
online show, MediaBytes, can be seen on WNBC and online. MediaBytes is a "two-minute
show" that "allow[s] an audience of people who are interested in [Palmer's] thoughts about
technology, media and entertainment to self-assemble." Id.
94 Id. Palmer notes that "Mediabytes, and the associated production materials, takes up
approximately 25% of my day.. . . I have not missed a business day in two years and I take
a complete road rig with me when I travel and produce Mediabytes from wherever I am.
Over the past week I was at Ft. Meade, MD, then in Rome, Italy, then in Banff, Canada and
back to NYC. I produced the show from every city and it was available by 9 AM EDT each
business day."
9 Szoka, supra note 83 (noting as an example of the commercial prong, that the intro-




a. Traditional Players Utilize the Web; the Web Utilizes Traditional Players
In response to the intense competition among media distribution methods,
traditional MVPDs have deployed innovative Web tools to distribute video
online. For example, in addition to investing billions into its fiber optic service,
96 new entrant Verizon FIOS has placed stock in on-demand programming and
an interactive, Web-based "widget bazaar."" In the reverse, YouTube has re-
cently expanded its operations to secure deals with talent agencies" and stream
full-length movies and television shows.99 By producing and distributing pro-
fessional content, YouTube hopes to generate advertising revenue while "be-
coming a home for premium video.""o
Other entities have focused on brokering deals with broadcasters to deliver
content both online and via traditional television by using some of the products
mentioned above. "' Apple has shown interest in partnering with ABC and
CBS to deliver shows directly through the Apple site, without requiring a cable
or satellite subscription.'O2 In this way, the viewer could "cut the cable cord""'
and make payments to Apple (presumably at a lower cost), while Apple pays
the broadcast networks for content-much like a traditional MVPD. "
96 Video Competition in a Digital Age: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commc'ns,
Tech., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1-3 (2009)
(statement of Terry Denson, Vice President of Content and Programming, Verizon), avail-
able at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20091022/denson-testimony.pdf [here-
inafter Denson Statement].
97 Id. at 5-6. Denson commented that:
FiOS TV Widgets . . .allow[] consumers to access content in an interactive manner on
their television, including some content and services from the Internet. Initially, Veri-
zon offered Widgets that allowed interactive and customizable access to weather, traf-
fic, local and national news headlines, daily national sports headlines, community news
or daily horoscopes. More recently, however, Verizon introduced additional Widgets
that allow consumers access to some Web content, including from Facebook and Twit-
ter. [Verizon plans] to foster a "Widget Bazaar," which is akin to an application store
for FiOS that will enable third-parties to develop innovative new Widgets for FiOS
customers.
Id.
98 See Brian Stelter, YouTube Said to Be Near Hollywood Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2009, at B 1.
99 Daisy Whitney, YouTube Dips Its Toe in Full-Length Video Market, TV WEEK (Oct.
19, 2008, 8:40 PM),
http://www.tvweek.com/news/2008/1 0/youtube dipsits toeinfuIlle.php.
100 Id.
lo See discussion, supra Part IV.A.I.
102 See Brian Stelter, A Proposal From Apple to Offer Online TV Subscriptions Stirs
Network Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B8.
103 See Adam Thierer, Cutting the Cord: The Shift to Online Video Continues, TECH.
LIBERATION FRONT (Oct. 6, 2008), http://techliberation.com/2009/10/06/cutting-the-video-
cord-the-shift-to-online-video-continues/.
104 Sam Schechner & Yukari Iwataki Kane, Apple TV Proposal Gets Some Nibbles,
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Similarly-modeled Hulu, the flagship video-on-demand ("VOD") service
and brainchild of NBC and Fox, is a perfect example of networks venturing
together to provide online content on an on-demand basis."' This model has
proven an extremely successful with both online viewerso' and advertisers' in
the face of increased MVPD competition."'0
b. Cutting Out the MVPD Middle-Man: Broadcasters Take Matters Into
Their Own Hands
In some cases, the broadcast networks have become their own distributors,
completely internalizing the production and distribution process over the Inter-
net and cutting out the MVPD middle man."'9 These programmers need eyes
on the screen to view their content, and understand that viewers are migrating
from their living room television set to the online marketplace."' In his Octo-
ber 2009 testimony before Congress on "Video Competition in a Digital Age,"
Disney Global Distribution President Benjamin Pyne recognized this trend,
and described the steps his network, ABC, is taking in response. "Looking into
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2009, at BI; Neil Kjeldsen, Download Your TV-The Current Op-
tions, TECHCRUNCH (May 22, 2006), http://techcrunch.com/2006/05/22/download-your-tv-
the-current-options/.
"os See Berin Szoka, Who Needs a DVR When You've Got Hulu?, TECH. LIBERATION
FRONT (Jan. 24, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/01/24/cutting-the-video-cord-who-
needs-a-dvr-when-youve-got-hulu/.
106 See Dan Frommer, Chart of the Day: Hulu Has More Viewers Than Time Warner,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2009, 4:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-
day-hulu-has-more-watchers-than-time-warner-cable-2009-8 (showing that in July 2009,
Hulu had 38 million viewers while Time Warner only had 34 million).
107 See, e.g. Ian Paul, The Simpsons: Worth More on Hulu Than Fox, PCWORLD (June
25, 2009, 9:14 AM) (explaining that advertisement rates on Hulu are more than that of
prime time television because of the targeted nature of VOD services).
10 See Brief for The Progress and Freedom Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (2010) (No. 08-1114) at 8 [hereinafter Pro-
gress and Freedom Foundation Amicus Brief] (noting that,
only in the last year . .. has the large-scale delivery of television content online become
a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers
of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new
class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites
such as Netflix, Hulu . . . . These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, li-
brary of currently-airing and archived content-as much as 90% of broadcast shows
and 20% of cable shows.).
Id. See Nick Wingfield, Turn On, Tune Out, Click Here: TV Viewers Cut Cable's Cord;
Here's What They're Watching Instead, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2008),
online.wsj.com/article/SB122299231747100497.html.
109 Hearing on Video Competition in a Digital Age Before the H. Subcomm. on Commu-
nications, Technology and the Internet, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Benjamin Pyne)
[hereinafter Pyne Testimony].
110 Id. at 1; see also GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 7.
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the future, as video consumption continues to migrate from traditional cable
and satellite distribution to broadband . . . consumers and programmers will
continue to have access to multiple distributors that are competitive and
equivalent."' For ABC, this includes not only their television programs, but
their national and local news as well." 2 The online video players that the net-
works have created in response have become highly successful, bearing out
Mr. Pyne's predictions."'
c. User-Generated Content: Cut the Programmer, Cut the MVPD
Innovative user-generated content has flourished over the past few years." 4
The leading example, YouTube, has transformed media viewers into content
creators and publishers. This shift is no longer comprised of short clips and
home videos. Entire series, often available exclusively on the web, have ex-
ploded in popularity and become "insanely personalized.""' Some Web series
have even reached the point of incorporating traditional writers and actors (par-
ticularly during the 2008-2009 writers' strike), and boast their own reviews
and award ceremonies-truly becoming "the new mainstream."' 16
All of these services constitute the innovative, competitive, and vibrant new
media marketplace. As discussed above, the merger and TV Everywhere
model is the response to this staggeringly competitive environment. The tradi-
tional players no longer have a stronghold on media, and will naturally seek to
tame this market.
3. The New Entity's Role in the Online Market
Opponents of the merger argue that the Comcast merger and its TV Every-
where model will stifle competitive online video services to the detriment of
Pyne Testimony, supra note 109 at 1.
12 See id at 7. Pyne commented that:
Notably, [ABC has] worked with the local ABC broadcast affiliates to design a ver-
sion of the media player for ABC content in which both the network and the affiliates
are able to participate. Affiliates can brand the player with their station's channel num-
ber and call letters, include local advertising, and provide links to local news and public
information that broadcasters provide their communities.
Id.
"3 See id. at 6-7 ("Since September 2008, the ABC.com media player alone has served
over 215 million episode requests. This summer alone, over 280 million Disney Channel
videos were streamed on Disney.com.").
114 Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for User-
Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 921, 926 (2009).
"I See Hesse, supra note 74 (noting that "3,000 would be a conservative estimate" on
the number of web series in May of 2009).
116 Id.
[Vol. 19166
The Comcast-NBC Universal Merger
consumers and competitors. In reality, the new entity merely offers what it al-
ready provides to its cable subscribers on an additional, innovative platform."'
As noted by National Cable and Telecommunications Association ("NCTA")
President and CEO, Kyle McSlarrow, the new model is simply "an effort to
ensure more content than ever is distributed over the Internet at no extra charge
to consumers.""' According to McSlarrow, the crux of the Free Press claims
lies in a misunderstanding of how programmers and distributors work to bring
video to the viewer."' He argues that "as online video evolves, various dis-
tributors and content companies may - and likely will - come to widely vary-
ing bilateral arrangements" as to how that content is delivered.120 In other
words, such innovative business models are natural in the evolving MVPD
market and should not be viewed as collusive efforts. Supporter and telecom-
munications author Andrew Keen provides a succinct bottom line on the TV
Everywhere model:
Those who choose to pay for cable service will be able to access this content for free
on the Internet; those who don't ... won't. And if current cable subscribers object for
any reason to the TV Everywhere scheme, then they can simply end their commercial
relationship with Comcast and go elsewhere to acquire their media.' 2'
As evidenced above, the highly competitive current media market provides a
plethora of opportunities for consumers to do so.
Additionally, because content owners have myriad retransmission agree-
ments across the spectrum of MVPDs,'22 the viewer who does not approve of
Comcast (or any other cable company, for that matter) is free to move their
business to a cable competitor, satellite provider, or the online marketplace.'23
Finally, as McSlarrow has noted, "antitrust laws do not prohibit, but encourage
collaboration, even among competitors, that lead to innovation and new prod-
ucts and services for consumers."'24 For Comcast to then go a step further by
securing what will naturally be better, internalized retransmission deals via
vertical integration with NBC-Universal is simply "their business model, their
very raison d'6tre." 25
Furthermore, it is not clear that the TV Everywhere model developed by
Comcast can actually survive market realities and remain a viable business




121 Andrew Keen, Only the Paranoid Are Scared of TV Everywhere, TECHCRUNCH (Jan.
16, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/16/paranoid-tv-everywhere/.
122 GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 9-10 (describing examples of content owners negotiat-
ing for higher carriage rates from MVPDs); see also discussion, supra Part IV.A.2.
123 Keen, supra note 121.
124 McSlarrow Statement, supra note 44.
125 Keen, supra note 121.
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plan. Traditional media platforms are up against an inexorably rising tide of
web-based and web-utilizing delivery models. The old business model is surely
being eaten away by those making the switch to online media exclusively, and
to simply stamp a website and media player on the old model may well prove
to be a fruitless effort. The advent of video over the Internet "is perhaps the
single largest investment controversy in the media sector,"l26 and with the pub-
lic clearly embracing this new technology, it is only natural that cable is rush-
ing to fill the void and attempting to "tame the web."' 27
Free Press and other merger opponents seem to assume that cable will be
successful in this endeavor.' For example, Marvin Ammori of Free Press re-
cently opined in this publication that "the current market structure provides
limited competition among MVPDs, with no additional competition on the
horizon."'29 However, as demonstrated above, the horizon reveals a tide of in-
novation in both the production and delivery of media, marked by a deluge of
user-generated content and diverse, personal video the likes of which have
never existed before.' 30
B. Diversity and Minority Programming
The post-merger entity will promote diverse programming and advance the
interests of minority-directed media companies without onerous merger condi-
tions. Opponents of the deal fear that voluntary public interest commitments
are insufficient to protect the interests of the ostensibly slim and endangered
sources of minority programming. '"' They argue that, absent stringent condi-
126 Arango, supra note 37.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., AMMORI, supra note 31; see also Free Press White Paper, supra note 33.
129 Marvin Ammori, Copyright's Latest Communications Policy: Content-Lock-Out and
Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television 18 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 375, 377 (2010).
130 Indeed, "the vertically integrated post-merger entity may have so many parts with
conflicting market incentives that it proves impossible to craft an internally consistent
profit-maximizing business strategy, no less exploit market power to undermine competi-
tion." GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 18-27.
131 See The Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal: Field Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Stanley Washington,
President and Chief Executive Officer, National Coalition of African American Owned
Media) [hereinafter Stanley Washington Testimony] (arguing that
[a]s of 2007, there were only eight African American owned full power commercial
television stations left in the entire nation. And most importantly, that same report
showed that in 2007, no cable networks were 100% African American owned. Today,
there are no cable networks with full nationwide distribution that are 100% African
American owned; thanks to gatekeepers such as Comcast).
Contra Comcast and NBC Universal: Who Benefits?: Field Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 111 th.Cong. (2010) (testimony of Will Griffin, Chairman and
CEO, Hip Hop On Demand) [hereinafter Will Griffin Testimony] (emphasizing that "if you
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tions (ranging from mandating wholesale broadband sales to regulating car-
riage rates to assuring that additional minority-owned stations be placed on the
dial), the deal would spell disaster for existing minority-directed niche chan-
nels and others who wish to enter the market.13 2
In fact, the merger is poised to advance the interests of minority-directed
media companies and programming in the traditional video sphere. As Will
Griffin, Chairman and CEO of Hip Hop On Demand, testified at Congressional
field hearings, "Comcast has the best infrastructure of inclusion [for minori-
ties] to build upon in the media industry.""' As an industry leader in minority
management that serves predominantly urban areas, Comcast is in a prime po-
sition to ensure that minority programmers' messages reach consumers.'34 In-
deed, Comcast has a competitive interest in protecting minority programming
in its traditional television lineup-by scaling back minority programming,
Comcast would risk losing customers in the company's core service areas.'
More importantly, any fears of a "highly powerful and influential media and
information colossus" "' are allayed in light of the existing and emerging video
define Africa-American Media Ownership at 100%, that undercuts the longstanding and
important work" in Congress to "invest in minority asset managers who in turn invest in
minority media firms." Griffin goes on to say that:
[t]his line of racial purity in public policy almost cost us a chance at American History.
Our President is Black enough. And so is TV One and so is Hip Hop On Demand. This
proposed myopic approach attempts to measure African-American media ownership
with a protractor, when what is truly needed is a compass. The True North is heading in
the direction of greater distribution access on more platforms, increased leadership in-
side of media companies, and combining our influence to secure our fair share of ad-
vertising dollars.
Id.
132 Comcast and NBC Universal: Who Benefits?: Field Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Samuel R. DeSimone, General
Counsel, EarthLink, Inc.) [hereinafter DeSimone Testimony]; Stanley Washington Testi-
mony, supra note 132; The Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal: Field
Hearing Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. (2010) (statements of Rep.
Maxine Waters, Member House Comm. On Judiciary).
133 Will Griffin testimony, supra note 131.
134 Id. at 4-5.
135 The company's core service areas include mostly inner cities and urban areas. See id.
at 5.
136 See Comcast and NBC Universal: Who Benefits?: Field Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Rep. Bobby L. Rush)
[hereinafter Rep. Rush Testimony]. Rep. Rush commented:
On that day, should Comcast and NBC-Universal secure their last approval from fed-
eral and state regulators to combine their highly attractive, and lucrative, distribution
and video programming assets, a very powerful and influential media and information
colossus will be born. If that day comes, this combined entity will have the immediate
power to determine what our nation watches, what we read, from where we get our





entertainment market. Just as Rep. Judy Chu of California was "shocked to
read [during one of the field hearings] that five companies own the bulk of the
broadcast and cable networks,"' lawmakers might be equally surprised to
learn the realities of the new media marketplace-that diversity and minority
programming is the essence of the new media market. Even merger-detractor
Samuel DeSimone of EarthLink correctly stated, "the costs and ease of market
entry in the [new media] market substantially enhances diverse and minority
viewpoints."'
Admittedly, the emerging video market-robust with opportunities for mi-
nority entrants-will place stress on traditional MVPDs and advertisers, which
may create cause for traditional MVPDs to cut programming. This is, however,
the nature of any emerging market that challenges the status quo, and these
pressures will not be confined to minority-directed content. Comcast's volun-
tary commitments and "infrastructure of inclusion" are more than sufficient to
maintain a healthy lineup of minority programming.'" Mr. Griffin notes that if
Comcast does not live up to these expectations, the largely minority represen-
tatives in Comcast's key service areas can threaten to block license and fran-
chise renewals or put political pressure on the company. 40 In this respect,
"[minority] consumers and policy makers have more potential leverage over
Comcast than any other media company." 4 '
C. Localism: Possibilities for Conditions
Maintaining a sufficient segment of local programming is an essential tenet
of the FCC's public interest mandate. Communities nationwide enjoy and de-
pend on local news, sports, and entertainment, making local affiliate stations
invaluable services. However, the emerging MVPD and online video market
poses a cognizable threat to these traditional local stations. While Comcast has
argued that investment in the struggling affiliate networks is an almost certain
byproduct of the merger and will surely spur additional, better quality pro-
gramming,'42 the new media market will place pressure on MVPDs to cut their
13 Joe Flint, Comcast-NBC Universal Hearing Offers Civics Lessons, But Not Always
the Right Ones, L.A. TIMES COMPANY TowN BLOG (June 9, 2010, 10:40 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/06/Comcast-nbc-universal-
hearing-offers-a-civics-lesson-but-not-the-right-one.html.
138 DeSimone testimony, supra note 132.
13 Id. at 3.
140 Id. at 5.
41 Id.
142 In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses General Electric
Company, Transferor, To Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Applications and Public Inter-
est Statement, MB Docket No. 10-56, at 39-40 (Mar. 5, 2010) (accessible via FCC Elec-
tronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Applications and Public Interest Statement].
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bottom line.
Indeed, investment in quality Comcast-owned programming is one of the
central reasons for the proposed merger.'43 Additionally, "the proposed transac-
tion creates significant opportunities to extend that news programming to other
outlets and platforms, such as Comcast's local and regional cable networks,
VOD [video-on-demand], and online."'"
However, the challenge will become whether Comcast makes its local sports
and broadcast stations available at reasonable rates. NBC affiliates themselves
have asked this much of the FCC. Specifically, "NBC's affiliates told the FCC
that the agency needed to ensure the availability of highly valued sporting
events on free, over-the-air broadcasting by preventing the migration of such
programming to Comcast cable channels."' 45 Thus, many localism concerns
raised by Free Press and others 46 are not unfounded.
The profitability of local programming is declining alongside local newspa-
pers and other news sources in the face of online media and news reporting,'47
and Comcast will undoubtedly seek to minimize losses to their bottom-line. As
news programming provided by NBC and its over 200 affiliate stations truly
are staples of American media culture," it will be important for the Commis-
sion to ensure that this content is readily available to the general public at
minimal or no cost. Comcast has conceded to "remain[] committed to continu-
ing to provide free over-the-air television through its O&O [owned and oper-
ated] broadcast stations and through local broadcast affiliates across the na-
tion."'49 However, it must be ensured that this commitment is carried out-
especially with the non-owned affiliate stations, as these remain staples of lo-
cal culture, and have been faced with rising costs and decreasing revenues.'
The goal here will be to make these assurances though conditions which
143 See Memorandum from David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President, Comcast 1-2
(Dec. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/PubliclnterestCommitments.pdf; see also
Applications and Public Interest Statement, supra note 142, app. 7, at 2.
144 Applications and Public Interest Statement, supra note 142, at 40-41.
145 See Joe Flint, NBC Affiliates Tell FCC to Make Sure Comcast Keeps Sports on NBC
After Merger, LA Times Company Town Blog (June 10, 2010, 16:20 EST),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/06/nbc-affiliates-tell-fcc-to-
make-sure-comcast-keeps-sports-on-nbc-after-merger.html; see also In re Applications for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, General Electric Company, Transferor, To
Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Comments of the NBC Television Affiliates, MB Docket
No. 10-56 (June 21, 2010) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
146 See, e.g. Free Press White Paper, supra note 33.
147 See GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 4-7.
148 Company Overview, NBC UNIVERSAL,
http://www.nbcuni.com/AboutNBCUniversal/CompanyOverview/overview02.shtml
(last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
149 Applications and Public Interest Statement, supra note 142, app. 8.
150 See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 23-25.
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state clearly Comcast's financial commitment to NBC affiliates and O&O
broadcast stations, so that these are not undercut by online distributors and
other competitors in the new and traditional media marketplace. Such a condi-
tion would be essential to preserving the public interest aspects of the deal, and
maintaining localism in news, sports, and public service programming in
American communities."' Ideally, the merger should be conditioned on the
establishment and maintenance of online local programming as currently em-
ployed by ABC as discussed above.'52
V. THE TEMPTATION TO OVERREACH: WHY CONDITIONS ON NET
NEUTRALITY AND RETRANSMISSION WOULD BE UNWISE
The vague public interest standard creates the opportunity for the FCC to
occasionally overreach in its regulatory authority.'" Often, ad hoc decision-
making at the Commission will result in the imposition of merger conditions
that would better be served by broader rulemakings at the Commission or poli-
cymaking in Congress.15 The story is the same with many of the major merg-
ers the FCC reviews: the Commission, when presented with the opportunity to
approve a deal, will take advantage of the position the parties are in and im-
pose conditions that satisfy stakeholders and interest groups in the short term,
but do not solve policy issues in the broader sense or for the longer term.
For example, during the Adelphia Cable merger with Comcast and Time
Warner in 2006, the Commission imposed a condition that required parties to
engage in arbitration to solve programming carriage disputes.'"' Programming
carriage disputes were, and still are, a major point of contention during that
merger. The hope in imposing a condition was obvious-to ensure fair dealing
between programmers and MVPDs. However, the "solution" sought by the
Commission was not a solution at all. The imposed condition was merely
cherry-picked from a condition placed on parties in a previous merger, and did
151 See GOLDFARB, supra note 29, at 24-25.
152 See discussion, supra Part IV.A.2.b.
"I See Weiser, supra note 62, at 198 ("because the imposition of "voluntary conditions"
provides an inviting (but less deliberative) alternative than industry-wide rulemaking or
formal adjudications, a cessation of that practice would encourage the FCC to rely on such
procedures. . . .").
154 Id. at 170-174.
155 In re Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Li-
censes Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession),
Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia Communications
Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Com-
cast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Trans-
feror, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corpora-
tion, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203 190 (July 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Adelphia Order].
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little to solve the overall problem of carriage rate negotiations. As shown be-
low, the Commission is poised to do the same with Comcast-NBC. In these
cases, "it is difficult to see how the public is better served through such ad hoc
decisions made in the merger review context-which leave incumbent provid-
ers not involved in mergers free of the relevant obligations-than through a
greater commitment to addressing those issues through industry-wide rulemak-
ing or adjudication."" 6
The issues of net neutrality and retransmission disputes are representative of
cases where the Commission will be tempted to regulate via condition-setting,
but would actually be better served by either industry-wide-rulemaking or
Congressional action.
A. Net Neutrality
It is not within the scope of this article to suggest an ultimate fix to the prob-
lem of net neutrality; numerous articles and reports have devoted countless
pages to more thorough analyses.' However, it is essential that all broadband
providers are subject to the same rules regarding network management. An
exhaustive analysis of the current broadband environment and rules that reflect
current practices are preferable, instead of imposing conditions on Comcast
alone during a merger review.
Unfortunately, the Commission is poised to fail in both respects. While the
FCC approved net neutrality rules in late December, these regulations do not
reflect current practices in the broadband provider community.' Further, the
new rules fail to provide certainty in the market.' This is evident not only in
the inherent vagueness of the Commission's Order, but also in the Congres-
sional backlash that the Commission provoked.'60 Ultimately, in the face of the
Comcast decision,"' Congressional action-as opposed to further attempts to
156 Weiser, supra note 62, at 173-74.
'57 See, e.g. Brooke Ericson, "Mobius-Strip Reasoning": The Evolution of the FCC's Net
Neutrality Nondiscrimination Principle for Broadband Internet Services and Its Necessary
Demise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1217 (2010); Tim Wu, Why Have A Telecommunications Law?
Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006);
Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that Challenge the Status
Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79 (2010).
158 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert McDowell In re Preserving the
Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-
52 at 3-4 (Rel. Dec. 23, 2010).
1 Id. at 6-8.
160 See Tony Romm, GOP Lawmakers Threaten to Repeal Net Neutrality, POLITICO
(Dec. 21, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46685.html.
161 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In April 2010, the D.C.
Circuit Court invalidated the Commission's initial attempt at regulating network manage-
ment. The Commission's actions in its net neutrality order, have been an attempt at circum-
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regulate by the Commission-would be preferable. This would yield clear and
certain rules, perhaps with the Commission left to enforce violations of the law
as defined by Congress. 62
To some, the emerging media market is viewed simply as another space in
which the new entity can restrict content and ensure that the "whenever, wher-
ever" media that the public is craving will not be permitted unless approved by
Comcast first.' 3 The fear is that the flourishing minority and niche voices de-
scribed above will ultimately be stifled by the imposition of discriminatory
network management on the part of Comcast.16' Public Knowledge presented
this argument succinctly in its petition to the FCC to oppose the merger:
the availability of video on the Internet is providing an unprecedented number of di-
verse media voices that are simply not possible via broadcast or MVPD system....
However, the diversity of this content does not ensure its continued survival in a mar-
ketplace of far larger entities, especially if those entities also control the means of dis-
tribution.16 1
The basic idea is that the Internet provider (in this case, Comcast) would be
able to degrade service speeds at specific times, or when the user is attempting
to access certain content (e.g. streaming video or peer-to-peer programs). 66
Comcast has quite famously employed these practices in the past: the pro-
vider's 2007 imposition of network management and "throttling" of service
related to bitTorrent is a stark example of how the new media market can be
subdued by service providers who stand in the position of gatekeepers.'6 1 It
also gives credence to concerns that post-merger Comcast would continue to
engage in similar activity. 6 1
Even with the passage of net neutrality rules, the Commission remains
venting this decision to achieve the same intended ends.
162 See, e.g. Henry Waxman, Statement on Net Neutrality Proposal, REPRESENTATIVE
HENRY A. WAXMAN (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.henrywaxman.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=209385.
163 See In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licensees, Petition to Deny of
Public Knowledge, MB Docket No. 10-56, at 6-10 (June 21, 2010) (accessible via FCC
Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Public Knowledge Petition] (stating that
"[Comcast] can unfairly discriminate against non-NBCU content, either by refusing to con-
nect users to the online video content of established competitors, or, more likely, simply de-
prioritizing or throttling the bandwidth available to these competitors versus NBCU con-
tent.").
164 Id.
165 Id. at 7.
166 See Saul Hansell, Comcast Tests a New Bandwidth Throttle, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(June 4, 2008, 2:07 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/comcast-tests-a-new-
bandwidth-black-list/.
167 See Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
168 Public Knowledge Petition, supra note 163, at 10 ("Comcast's past actions in block-
ing alternative content and delivery methods demonstrate that the merged entity has existing
means and motive to continue such practices.").
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committed to imposing conditions on the merger regarding Comcast's provi-
sion of content over the Internet. While this is certainly unsurprising, it fuels
the argument that the Commission's current rules are uncertain. At best, a
merger condition related to Comcast's network management and online pro-
gramming will be a signal to the industry that the Commission's newly-
championed net neutrality rules will be ineffective.
B. Retransmission Rules: Ripe for Reform
While Comcast and NBC Universal have no doubt proven to be impressive
innovators in the video production and delivery business,"' reservations linger
regarding how their combination will affect the traditional video entertainment
market.'" No clearer have these fears played out than in the recent carriage
disputes between programmers and distributors. For example, the dispute be-
tween Cablevision and Fox wreaked havoc in the Northeast through most of
October. Failing to reach a carriage agreement, three million viewers in the
New York area were deprived of Fox programming-along with the entirety of
the National League Championship Series and much of the World Series."'
After what amounted to be an extraordinarily long and dramatic blackout (two
weeks in all), Fox was restored just in time for the last two games of the World
Series.'72 With three million viewers in the New York area blacked out during
baseball playoffs, one can only image what would have happened if the Yan-
kees had made it to the World Series.
In fact, sports programming has been particularly affected by retransmission
disputes. According to Terry Denson, Vice President of Content and Pro-
gramming for Verizon:
Regional sports is among the most popular programming to consumers, many of
whom are loyal sports fans and insist on the ability to see the games of their local
teams. Given its very nature, this programming is unique and cannot be duplicated by
new entrants who are denied access. For consumers who are Knicks or Rangers fans,
the games of other teams or other sports are no substitute, and a competitive provider
lacking those games--or lacking them in HD-will not be [a] meaningful alternative
169 See generally An Examination of the Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC
Universal, Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and
the Internet, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Brian Roberts and Jeff Zucker).
170 See generally Free Press White Paper, supra note 33.
1' See Brian Stelter & Bill Carter, Fox-Cablevision Blackout Reaches a Second Day,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at B3.
172 Brian Stelter & Bill Carter, Fox and Cablevision Deal Returns Signal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2010, at A28 (noting that "most blackouts of local stations last only a matter of
hours"); see also 2010 MLB Postseason Schedule, MLB.coM,
http://mlb.com/mlb/schedule/ps.jsp?y=10 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010) (showing that the Na-
tional League Championship Series was played between Oct. 16 and Oct. 23, and the World




Indeed, Verizon and its FiOS service have been effectively locked out of
carrying the Madison Square Garden networks in the New York area for some
time-a situation that has undoubtedly affected subscribership."' Similarly,
hockey fans with DirecTV were left in the dark for much of the 2010 season;
in the face of a heated dispute between the satellite provider and the Comcast-
owned sports network VS.'" Even the Tennis Channel has filed an FCC com-
plaint against Comcast regarding its carriage,'76 yet another case in a long line
of disputes between programmers and distributors.
Unfortunately, complaints to the Commission regarding carriage rate dis-
putes have not been well-received. Larry Cohen of the Communications Work-
ers of America pointed out during the February House Judiciary Committee
hearing that "bringing a carriage access complaint to the FCC is not a mean-
ingful remedy. The complaint process currently lacks any concrete deadlines
for FCC action, with many complaints languishing at the Commission for
years.""'
However, the lies a caveat in the argument that the Commission should take
action during its review of the proposed merger of Comcast and NBC Univer-
sal: none of the above-noted carriage disputes involve Comcast. While this is
not to say that Comcast does not engage in similar behavior-it certainly
does 78 -the issue affects the entire traditional MVPD market, not just the par-
ties under current review. As Congresswoman Blackburn expressed during a
February House Subcommittee hearing, the FCC should not undertake "regula-
tory shenanigans" by using this merger as an excuse to impose regulations that
would better passed independently of the current merger.17 As precedent dic-
tates, when the Commission attempts to impose regulation where it would not
13 Denson Statement, supra note 96, at 8-9.
174 Id. at 10.
175 See Richard Sandomir, Dispute May Prevent Viewers From Watching NHL Openers
on DirecTV, N.Y. TIMES.COM (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/sports/hockey/Olversus.html.
176 See Todd Shields, Tennis Channel Files an FCC Complaint Against Comcast, Busi-
NESSWEEK (Jan 6, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-
06/tennis-channel-files-an-fcc-complaint-against-comcast-updatel-html.
'I Competition in the Media and Entertainment Distribution Market: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (testimony of Larry Cohen, President,
Comm'cns Workers of Am.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Cohen 00225.pdf [hereinafter Cohen Testimony].
178 Id. at 5-6.
179 An Examination of the Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal before
the House Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Rep. Marsha Blackburn, Member, House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce).
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otherwise have the authority, courts are reluctant to defer to the agency.'s So,
while fears of even more retransmission negotiation failures may be well-
grounded, the current merger review is not the appropriate venue for FCC ac-
tion that would be better suited to apply across the industry as a whole.'
Alternatively, in the absence of FCC action, Congress has begun to respond
to the public's calls for reform. In late October, Senator John Kerry voiced his
frustration with FCC inaction by sending the Commission draft legislation to
resolve the problem. 182 Senator Kerry noted that "the voices of angry consum-
ers in... news coverage [of negotiation failures] speak volumes," and that
"there are important equities and business interests at stake in these negotia-
tions."' If and until Congress or the Commission decide to act on this issue,
viewers can use technology to view their favorite sports programs online.184
VI. CONCLUSION
Any evaluation of the proposed merger between Comcast and NBC Univer-
sal must take place in the context of the new media marketplace. In its public
interest analysis, the FCC is charged with looking ahead to future develop-
ments in its particularized field and acting accordingly. The new media mar-
ketplace introduced and evaluated above is this future-with increased compe-
tition among content producers and programmers, combined with the latest
innovative technologies to deliver it. The traditional players in the program-
ming and MVPD field will be forced to adjust or fall by the wayside. The gi-
ants among these-Comcast and NBC Universal-have recognized this reality
18 Weiser, supra note 62, at 173-74.
181 Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 45, at 336 ("In reviewing cable industry mergers, the
FCC makes a careful determination as to whether such programming distribution issues are
better resolved through company-specific, merger-specific conditions, or whether existing
program access laws, which apply to the industry generally, are sufficient.")
182 See Letter from John Kerry, United States Senator, to the Honorable Julius Gena-
chowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, (Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=84bcc Ibf-c9dc-4893-9488-aedf56d8b953. Senator
Kerry wrote that:
[Chairman Genachowski] testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that the re-
transmission consent system was under review and had been since the previous New
Year. Further, a petition that seeks to modify the FCC's rules for retransmission con-
sent negotiations has been pending before the FCC since March 2010. The FCC has
had sufficient time to consider the comments that have been filed on that petition and
begin the process to revise its rules. But in the absence of FCC action, I feel a respon-
sibility to begin to consider the smartest, least intrusive actions to reform the law.
Id.
183 Id.
184 For example, this is what New York area viewers did during the October 2010 Fox
blackout. See Christian Livermore, Cable Clash Turns Some to Web, TIMES HERALD RE-
CORD, Oct. 20, 2010, at 51.
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and begun to respond accordingly.
Few claims that the deal will harm the public interest actually hold water
when viewed in this context. Arguments against the localism repercussions of
the merger will be the most successful, and the Commission would be advised
to place conditions accordingly - namely that the new entity establish and
maintain online local broadcasting for free, in the model espoused by ABC.'
Those claims that the deal will stifle minority and diverse programming are de
facto countered by the very nature of the new media marketplace - which
thrives on innovative, diverse, and user-generated content to make the video
entertainment of tomorrow "insanely personalized."' 6 Assertions that the new
entity will harm competition rely fundamentally on the assumption that "the
current market structure provides limited competition among MVPDs, with no
additional competition on the horizon""'-a claim that is patently untrue in the
face of the new and emerging media marketplace.
If there is any lesson to be learned from analyzing the dynamics of the new
media marketplace, it is that the most popular method of delivering the most
popular content is constantly changing. The likely projection is that the new
media marketplace will soon usher in a new era of viewership that will leave
the traditional media giants struggling to adapt and adjust to maintain profits.
The Xfinity "TV Everywhere" model proposed by Comcast may likely find
itself as one player amidst intensifying competition between delivery mediums,
many of which sustained by business models which are incredibly innovative
and are not reliant on traditional profit-gathering methods.
The proposed merger should and likely will be passed with few conditions.
This will set the stage for a future in which the Commission can step in to
broadly regulate the programming carriage problems that have plagued the
cable industry for years, and the additional network management concerns that
are beginning to manifest. These regulatory steps should not take place in the
context of a narrow merger review, where they will be ineffective at best, and
outside the realm of Commission authority at worst.
185 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b.
186 Hesse, supra note 74.
187 Marvin Ammori, Copyright's Latest Communications Policy: Content-Lock-Out and
Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 375, 377 (2010).
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